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HEGEL IN MODERN 
FRENCH PHILOSOPHY : 
THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS 
Bruce BAUGH 
RÉSUMÉ : La célèbre dialectique du maître et de l'esclave de Hegel n'est pas aussi centrale dans 
la philosophie française contemporaine qu'on a l'habitude de le dire. A partir des années 1920, 
les travaux de Jean Wahl et Alexandre Koyré privilégient une autre figure de la Phénoménologie 
de l'Esprit, la «conscience malheureuse», considérée comme décisive pour comprendre la 
philosophie hégélienne du concept, du temps et de l'histoire. Comme la « conscience malheu-
reuse », tous ces thèmes sont liés à l'existence humaine qui se caractérise par une série 
d'inversions et d'antithèses plutôt que par une progression dialectique passant du conflit à la 
médiation à la réconciliation et à la synthèse. Ce courant d'interprétation se poursuit chez 
Hyppolite, Sartre, les surréalistes et même chez Derrida, et il provoque une réaction critique 
de la part de Henri Lefebvre. 
SUMMARY: Hegel's famous dialectic of master and slave is not as central to modern French 
philosophy as is usually supposed. Beginning in the 1920s in the work of Jean Wahl and 
Alexandre Koy ré, another figure from the Phenomenology of Spirit, the "unhappy 
consciousness, " is seen as central to an understanding of Hegel's theory of the concept, time 
and history. All of these are related to human existence, which (like the unhappy consciousness) 
is characterized by a series of reversals and antitheses, rather than a dialectical progression 
from conflict through mediation to reconciliation and synthesis. This strand of interpretation 
continues through Hyppolite, Sartre, surrealism and even Derrida, and provoked a critical 
response from Henri Lefebvre. 
T he story of the reception of Hegel in France has usually taken as its theme the French understanding of the dialectic of master and slave in Hegel's Phenomenology 
of Spirit1 and the importance of this reading of Hegel for a theory of history. The 
central figure in this story — the hero — is Alexandre Kojève, whose lectures at the 
1. G.W.F HFXIEL, La Phénoménologie de l'esprit, trans. Jean Hyppolite, Paris, Aubier, 1939-1941. 
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École Pratique des Hautes Études from 1933 to 19392 have attained nearly mythic 
status.3 
Yet I would like to suggest a different way of narrating this story, one which takes 
as its central theme not the dialectic of master and slave, but another "'figure of Spirit" 
from the Phenomenology, that of the unhappy consciousness. On this interpretation, 
if there is a central figure in modern French Hegelianism, it is Jean Wahl, whose 
Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel4 marked a significant step in 
the "humanisation" of Hegelian philosophy in France. The unhappy consciousness 
can also be seen as a dominant theme in those post-modern theorists who refuse the 
possibility of any final reconciliation or synthesis. If there is no synthesis, then there 
can be no dialectic, properly speaking, but only anti-thetics, the play of opposed terms 
that negate and pass into each other without ever coinciding in a meaningful whole. 
Dialectics requires the mediation of a third term that comprises both thesis and anti-
thesis, and so can bring to a halt the ceaseless play of negations. If there is neither 
God nor an end of history, either of which would give us an all-embracing totality 
through which all oppositions could be mediated, then "human reality is by nature 
an unhappy consciousness, with no possibility of transcending its unhappy state."5 
I. THE HUMANISATION OF THE BEGRIFF 
At the same time as Hegel's philosophy won acceptance in France through a narrowing 
down of the scope of the dialectic to the domain of human historical action, and the 
abandonment of the idealistic side of Hegel, there occured a humanisation of the 
Hegelian "notion" in the work of Jean Wahl and Alexandre Koyré, the origins of 
which can be traced as far back as Victor Delbos' lectures on Post-Kantian philosophy 
at the Sorbonne in 1909.6 
What most struck Delbos about the Hegelian synthesis is that it is both the origin 
and the result of a dialectical progression, and it is this feature that would lead Delbos 
to identify the moment of synthesis with Hegel's Begriff, and the latter with an Absolute 
Subject. On the one hand, the moment of synthesis for Hegel is the result of spirit's 
self-development through increasingly inclusive and determinate conceptions.7 On the 
other hand, however, the synthesis is prior to its parts, and prior to the opposing terms 
from which it apparently emerges as a resolution. For it is only through the synthesis 
that terms are related to each other as mutually determining contraries, that is, as 
thesis and anti-thesis, rather than as indifferently or indeterminately related differing 
2. Alexandre KOJÈVE, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, texts edited and assembled by Raymond Queneau, 
Paris, Gallimard, 1947 ; hereafter 1LH. 
3. See Vincent DESCOMBES, Le Même et l'autre ; quarante-cinq ans de la philosophie française, Paris, M inuit, 
1979. 
4. Jean W A H L , Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel, Paris, Rieder, 1929. 
5. Jean-Paul SARTRE, L'Être et le néant (Tel), Paris, Gallimard, 1976, p. 129; hereafter given as EN. 
6. See DELBOS, "La méthode de démonstration chez Hegel," Revue de métaphysique et de morale (hereafter 
RMM), 32 (1925), p. 271-281 and "Le premier principe comme pensée infinie (Hegel)," RMM, 28 (1921), 
p. 37-47. 
7. Cf. DELBOS, "La méthode de démonstration chez Hegel," p. 271-273. 
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terms. This is so not only in thought, but in being. Since it is the synthesis which 
determines and sustains the relation between thesis and anti-thesis, it "is genuinely 
creative ; it is the reason for the moments it subordinates and comprises," in the sense 
of being both their cause and their goal.8 It is because the Begriff is a synthesis that 
conditions itself through its own ends, and is in that sense the cause of itself, that it 
must, says Delbos, be thought of as an Absolute Subject.9 
The chief interest in this interpretation is the implication that the synthesis precedes 
itself. The synthesis is the origin of the "immediate" origin (the opposition between 
thesis and anti-thesis) from which it emerges as their resolution. As Derrida might 
have put it, the synthesis is an "originary non-origin,"10 a future or end that conditions 
its past, and which is never — unlike the thesis — immediately present, and so never 
a simple origin or starting point. 
Derrida's description of an "originary non-origin" that both precedes and is 
subsequent to itself, and is so irreducibly double that even in the first instance it is a 
repetition (of itself) and a re-presentation, strongly resembles Delbos' interpretation 
of the Begriff as a synthesis that doubles back on itself in order to produce and enclose 
its own prior moments. Derrida writes : 
The present offers itself as such, appears, presents itself, opens the stage (scène) of time 
and the time of the stage [...] only in repetition, in representation. In dialectics [...] For 
if one appropriately conceives the horizon of dialectics — outside a conventional Hege-
lianism — one understands, perhaps, that dialectics is the original movement of finitude, 
of the unity of life and death, of difference, of original repetition, that is, of the origin 
of tragedy as the absence of a simple origin. In this sense, dialectics is tragedy, the only 
possible affirmation to be made against the philosophical or Christian idea of pure origin, 
against "the spirit of beginnings."" 
The question is how Derrida may lay claim to a conception of "origin" bearing 
the marks of Hegelian synthesis, while at the same time denying both the possibility 
of such a synthesis and the dialectic of thesis and anti-thesis for which this synthesis, 
and in particular in the form of an absolutely self-conditioned subject, is the necessary 
foundation. How, in other words, could there be a doubling of origin such as occurs 
when the apparently third term, synthesis, stands at the origin of the immediate origin 
if for Derrida, opposed terms pass into one another in much the way they do in Hegel's 
logic, but "without ever constituting a third term, without ever leaving room for a 
solution in the form of speculative dialectics" ?12 
We can only raise this question here. But in order to see how Hegel's dialectic 
becomes a tragedy without resolution in Derrida, we must look back to the work of 
Jean Wahl. In Wahl's work, Delbos' humanisation of the Begriff is taken a step further 
8. DELBOS, "La méthode," p. 279; my emphasis. 
9. See "La méthode," p. 272; "Premier principe," p. 38. 
10. DKRRIDA, L'Écriture et la différence, Paris, Seuil, 1967, p. 303. 
11. DKRRIDA, Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, 
p. 248. See also ibid., p. 11, 14, 202, 237, 246 and 297, and Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri 
Spivak, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, p. 61, 157 and elsewhere. 
12. DERRIDA, Positions, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 43. 
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by being given an affective basis. For Wahl, Hegel's search for a "concrete universal," 
the speculative Begriffthat overcomes and reconciles oppositions, was not motivated 
by purely theoretical concerns, but by the feeling that "abstraction is by its very 
definition a dismemberment of life."13 When Hegel unites opposed terms in the Begriff, 
which contains "the multiplicity of determinations, of the moving negations it 
encloses," he has found a philosophical way of arriving at the kind of wholeness which 
he had earlier sought in love and in religion. The Hegelian "notion" aims at a synthesis 
of the duality of the sensible and the intelligible that preserves their differences, a 
unity of duality (difference) and unity (identity) that Wahl calls a "triplicity," and 
behind which we see reflected the Triune God. 
The notion, being founded on reason, stands higher than love or the God of faith, 
however ; it is a rational reconciliation of opposites.14 Nevertheless, however rational 
the result, the motivation for reconciliation is affective : for separation is pain, contra-
diction is evil (le mal), and the awareness of these renders consciousness unhappy.15 
The Begriff'is then the answer to the unhappy consciousness's prayer: "the unhappy 
consciousness, in seeing this separation of united elements, that is, of the sensible and 
the intelligible, will have the notion of their union and will be the happy consciousness." 
In general, "abstraction is synonomous with unhappiness ; joy, for spirit, will be the 
concrete universal."16 "The beginning of philosophy, as of religion, is less wonder 
than non-satisfaction and the dismembered consciousness (la conscience déchirée)."17 
Just as the notion is an ideal of reconciliation of the self with itself before being 
the basis of philosophical science, so too the dialectic, before being a method, is the 
experience of a divided consciousness striving for unity. The dialectical progression 
from one stage of experience to the next is driven by the reversals suffered by 
consciousness when it tries to grasp its object. The understanding is forced to define 
each of its categories with reference to its opposite : 1 cannot define being without 
reference to non-being, sameness without reference to difference and so on. Each time 
consciousness seeks to define its object in terms of these categories, then, it is "driven 
from the one to the other of these categories by the negative force of reason,"18 with 
the result that each of them turns into its opposite (for example, identity differs from 
difference and difference is identical to itself in differing from identity.) This creates 
a form of ontological insecurity : every affirmation of consciousness comes to naught1'' 
13. See WAHL, Le Malheur, préface, p. V; "Sur la formation de la théorie hégélienne du Be griff,"* Revue de 
l'histoire de la philosophie, 1 (1927), p. 437-456 and 2 (1928), p. 72-92; "Note sur les démarches de la 
pensée de Hegel," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger (hereafter RPF El) 101 (1926), p. 281-
289 ; these two articles reappear as chapters of Le Malheur. 
14. See also DELBOS, "Le Premier Principe," p. 46-47. 
15. See WAHL, Le Malheur, "Préface." 
16. Le Malheur, p. 154. 
17. WAHL, "Note sur les démarches de la pensée de Hegel," RPFE, 101 (1926), p. 289. 
18. WAHL, "Note sur les démarches de la pensée de Hegel," RPFE, 101, p. 282-283. Cf. HYPPOLITE, Intro-
duction à la philosophie de l'histoire de Hegel, Paris, Seuil, 1983, p. 78. 
19. See WAHL, "Note sur les démarches...". 
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and consciousness becomes aware of itself as "absolute negativity"20 and as the vani-
shing nothingness of the finite determinations it produces (448-449). 
Consciousness is unhappy not simply because it feels itself to be nothing, however, 
but because it at the same time is aware of itself as being something other than 
nothingness (448): it is both being and nothingness (451). It both is and is not its 
object (444) ; it is both the infinite power of universal thought and the finite transi-
toriness of particular thoughts, without being able to think these two together (446).21 
Its unhappiness arises, then, out of its dual nature or duplicity (444)22 : "for what is 
more unhappy than the opposition at the heart of a unity at which consciousness has 
arrived ?" (446). If it were simply being or simply nothingness, consciousness would 
be tranquil. As it is, it is "absolute unrest" (444), because every time it affirms its 
being (e.g. as thought) it discovers its nothingness (e.g. as changeable thought contents), 
and it discovers its being in the very act of affirming its nothingness, for in affirming 
"I am not," I am (451). In the unhappy consciousness, consciousness finds no rest; 
"it is too small for itself because it is greater than itself,"23 and rather than grasping 
itself as a unity of infinite thought and finite existence, it oscillates between the two 
poles. "Just at the moment when consciousness attains its unity, we are in the presence 
of a game of 'loser wins,' where there is a continual reversal and an incessant irony, 
where consciousness ends up with, it seems, the opposite of what it sought" (467).24 
Wahl's discovery of a pan-tragicist Hegel behind the pan-logicist of the System 
set the tone for subsequent French Hegel studies ; the truth of Hegel is to be found 
in the striving and pathos of the dialectical movement itself, which corresponds to 
consciousness' search for reconciliation with itself and with objective reality.25 Wahl 
himself would later reject as illusory the Hegelian attempt to reconcile subjective 
existence in thought, and so turned away from the mediation of the notion and the 
dialectic based on it.26 But before exploring further Wahl's investigations, we should 
take note of another effort to humanise the notion, that of Alexandre Koyré.27 
Koyré had been trained in Husserl 's phenomenology in Germany, and regarded 
Hegel's philosophy as a phenomenology in the Husserlian sense (152n, 178) and as 
20. WAHI,, "Commentaire d'un passage de la Phénoménologie de Hegel," RMM, 34 (1927), p. 441-471, 
reprinted as a chapter of Le Malheur; page references within the text to RMM. 
21. Cf. HYPPOI.ITE, Introduction, p. 31. 
22. Cf. SARTRE, EN, p. 93. 
23. Le Malheur, p. 155. 
24. Sartre's notion of "bad faith" owes much to Wahl's description of the duplicity of consciousness ; see section 
II.5. below. The theme of "loser wins" is also prominent in Sartre's essays and plays, for example, his 
study of Genet, Saint Genet, comédien et martyr, Paris, Gallimard, 1952, and his play, Le diable et le bon 
dieu, Paris, Gallimard, 1951. It is also a theme which surfaces frequently in Derrida's work. 
25. Wahl's most notable influence in this regard was on Jean Hyppolite. See HYPPOLITE, "Les travaux de 
jeunesse de Hegel d'après des ouvrages récents," RMM, 42 (1935), p. 399-426 and 549-578 ; Introduction 
à la philosophie de l'histoire de Hegel, p. 49-64 and 104; and Pierre BERTRAND, "Le sens du tragique et 
du destin dans la dialectique hégélienne," RMM, 47 (1940), p. 165-186. 
26. See WAHI., Vers le concret, Paris, Vrin, 1932 and Études kierkegaardiennes, Paris, Aubier, 1938. 
27. See KOYRÉ'S two "Hegel à léna" articles, Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses, 5 (1935), p. 420-
428, and RPFE, 118 (1934), p. 274-283 ; page references in the text are to the reprint of the 1935 article 
in Etudes d'histoire de la pensée philosophique, p. 147-189. 
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a philosophical anthropology (179n) akin to Heidegger's Scin unci Zcit (a view later 
shared by Kojève).28 This is true not only of the Phenomenology, says Koyré, but even 
of the Jena Logic and Realphilosophie. The reason is that, according to Koyré, "Hegel's 
philosophy in fact seems to be, in its deepest intuitions, a philosophy of time" (163), 
and indeed of "human time, the time of man (177)," the time of which the primary 
dimension is the future (160n, 170, 176-177). Human time is primarily futural because 
man is a being "who is what he is not and is not what he is,2" a being who negates 
what he is to the benefit of what he is not, or is not yet, a being who, starting from 
the present, negates it, seeking to realise itself in the future" (177). Hegelian time, 
then, is the time of human self-realization through action (178-179), the negation of 
what is for the sake of what one is not but would be. Because this time is that of 
progressive self-development, it is essentially historical (177), or oriented, rather than 
being cyclical or repetitive, as is the biological time of natural functions, or "life" 
(153n). Only in the historical time of action — in the positing and realization of an 
end — does the future take precedence over the present and the past ( 160n). 
Koyré here deliberately conflates Hegel's definition of natural time {Encyclopedia 
§ 258) — "a being which is what it is not and is not what it is"30 — with Heidegger's 
definition of Dasein as Zeitlichkeit (see 178n). The result is a series of identifications : 
of the notion with spirit, of spirit with time (175), of time with human temporality 
(179) :31 
This primacy of the future over the now, of the possible over the actual, is this not the 
analysis of man ? And the dialectic of the instant, 'which is insofar as it is not and is not 
insofar as it is,' which negates what it is to the benefit of what it is not, is this not the 
expression of the unrest of human being, for whom time 'stops' when he has no more 
future, when there remains nothing more to come, when everything has already come to 
pass ?32 
Time is existential (188), and the foundation of the dialectic is historical time, 
which is human time : "For, as Hegel says, it is we who project ourselves into the 
future, in negating our present and in making it into a past. And it is we again who, 
in our memory, take up and revive this completed and dead past" (187-188). Since 
human temporality thus stands at the basis of historical time, and it is historical time 
that is the model for spirit's self-development, Hegel's logic, which recounts this 
development, is identical to a philosophy of (human) history (178, 187). Outside of 
28. See KOJÈVE, ILH, p. 38-39, 57, 417 and 527nl. 
29. Cf. SARTRE, who appropriates this definition of la réalité humaine, EN, p. 94 and elsewhere. Hyppolite 
also uses this expression, e.g. in his Logique et existence, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1952, 
p. 240, as does KOJÈVE, ILH, p. 12. 
30. Koyré's reference (p. 164n) is to HEGEL, Encyclopedic', § 258: "Die Zeit als die negative Einheit des 
Aussersichseins ist ein schlechthin Abstraktes, ideelles.— Sie ist das Sein das, indem es ist, nicht ist, und 
indem es nicht ist, ist." Koyré adds that the Hegel's Aussersichsein is equivalent to the term extase, which 
has been "made famous by a recent theory" (presumably Heidegger's theory of the temporal ecstases of 
Dasein. ) 
31. Kojève makes the same series of identifications; see ILH, p. 370-375. 
32. KOYRÉ, "Hegel à léna," RPEE, 118 (1934), p. 280-281. Cf. KOJÈVE, ILH, p. 382. 
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history, there is neither spirit nor dialectic — a thesis usually attributed to Kojève,33 
but already present in Koyré's interpretation of Hegel. 
The result of these identifications is that in Koyré 's hands, Hegel's logic becomes 
an anthropology. Quite simply, the dialectic and the notion reflect the temporal struc-
tures of historical human existence, the essence of which is the priority of the future 
end over the immediate present (174n). When Koyré states that "The time and space 
Hegel describes are not those of things, they are the time and space of man,"34 it 
might be thought that he is making Hegel into a philosophical anthropologist as opposed 
to a logician. In fact, he is subordinating Hegel's logic and metaphysics to anthropology. 
Since Hegel's time and space are not only those of man, but also those of spirit and 
the concept (175), which are the basis of the entire "system," it follows that everything 
is to be understood on the basis of human existence (188). Even being is modeled on 
human temporality : according to Koyré, just as Hegel makes the eternal historical 
(see 162n, 176n, 187) by incorporating negation in the Absolute, he finds unrest and 
movement in being itself, which flees and negates itself to become its other and to 
realize itself in and by that self-negation (162-163). In this respect, Koyré 's interpre-
tation differs from Kojève's, since Kojève argues that the application of an essentially 
anthropological ontology to Nature in the Logic is in error (ILH 39), the reason being 
that Nature does not have a history (ILH 503), and consequently lacks the dialectical 
temporality upon which Hegel's logic depends (ILH 385). 
For Koyré, then, as for Wahl, the model for Hegel's Be griff is to be found in 
human existence, but in Koyré's case this model is not the wholeness of a self that 
has surmounted its internal oppositions (the "concrete universal"), but rather the 
historicity that raises man above mere animal existence (see 153n5), and which consists 
in the transcending of what one is towards one's possibilities through creative action, 
a process that constitutes the essence of human freedom (189).35 The notion includes 
the temporal structure of historical self-transcendence within itself because, like free, 
historical humanity, it is the victorious outcome of the struggle in which spirit posits, 
negates, transcends and annihilates itself (174), a historical result that is not separable 
from its temporal development, not even in thought.36 Human historicity and the 
speculative notion mirror each other; logic is history (163).37 
One might have the impression that this apparently "heroic" and triumphalist 
Hegelianism is very far from the unhappy consciousness. Yet for Koyré, there can be 
no final reconciliation, no "happy" outcome of this process of self-realisation, because 
the condition of the possibility of history — human self-transcendence and self-negation 
— is what renders impossible an end to history : 
33. See KOJÈVE, ILH, p. 198, 419 ff and 386 ff. 
34. KOYRÉ, "Hegel à Iéna," RPFE, 118 (1934), p. 280-281. 
35. See also Charles ANDI.ER, "Le fondement du savoir dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel," RMM, 
38 (1931), and HYPPOUTE, "Vie et prise de conscience de la vie dans la philosophie hégélienne d'Iéna," 
RMM, 45 (1938), p. 45-61. 
36. See KOJÈVE, ILH, p. 390-391 and elsewhere. 
37. Compare KOJÈVE, ILH, p. 419-420. 
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It is because man is essentially dialectical, that is to say, essentially negating, that the 
dialectic of history, no, that history itself is possible. It is because man says "no" to his 
present — or to himself — that he has a future. It is because he negates himself that he 
has a past. It is because he is time — and not simply temporal — that he has a present 
[...]. [Yet] if time is dialectical and if it is constructed from out of the future, it is — 
what-ever Hegel says — eternally unfinished [...] One cannot fore-see the future, and the 
Hegelian dialectic does not permit us to, since the dialectic, the expression of the creative 
role of negation, at the same time expresses freedom [...] The philosophy of history, and 
similarily Hegelian philosophy, the "system," would only be possible if history were at 
an end, if there were no future, if time could stop (188-189). 
The historical consciousness reflected in the Begriffh thus at the same time an 
unfulfilled and an unhappy one, with no possibility of being happy save at the price 
of ceasing to be historical, that is, ceasing to be. Conversely, the historicity of the 
Be griff, its inseparability from the self-negations that constitute it as a result, render 
problematic the Begriff itself as a final reconciliation. In the case of both consciousness 
and the Begriff, completion or fulfillment would require an end to negation and 
transcendence, and so a kind of death.38 
For Koyré, at any rate, the unhappy consciousness is inescapable. The only diffence 
between Koyré and Kojève on this question is that the former holds that if history 
came to an end, then that would be the death of man, whereas the latter holds that 
history is over, and man is dead.39 By the same token, Kojève asserts the when history 
ends and man dies, the unhappy consciousness is overcome : man achieves total 
"satisfaction," and there is no transcendence because there is no longer anything to 
strive for.40 For both, the end of the unhappy consciousness is death. 
It would be superfluous to enumerate further the many ways in which Koyré 's 
interpretation anticipates Kojève's,41 or to point out that Koyré's definition of human 
reality is the same as Sartre's. Koyré's articles converge with Wahl's in the direction 
of the complete humanisation of Hegel's philosophy : for at this point, the Hegelian 
Begriff itself has become anthropomorphic. 
38. This parallels Derrida's notion that closure, the end of the movement of signification, is the death of 
meaning ; see section III. Derrida discusses Hegel's Jena writings and sections 257-259 of the Encyclopedia, 
the very sections Koyré discusses, in "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time" in 
Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982. Like Koyré, 
Derrida sees great affinities between Hegelian time and Heideggerian temporality (see especially p. 44-
45). Although Derrida does not mention Koyré here, he does cite "Hegel à féna" in "Difference", Margins, 
p. 13-14. 
39. SeelLH, p. 95, 153-155, 194-195, 383-385. 
40. See Gaston FRSSARD, "Deux interprètes de la Phénoménologie de Hege! : Jean Hyppolite et Alexandre 
Kojève," Études, 255 (1947), p. 368-373. 
41. Koyré preceded Kojève at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, where Koyré had lectured on Hegel from 
1931 to 1933; see ILH, p. 57. 
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II. THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS 
1. Wahl : the existential protest. 
If the full humanisation of Hegel's Be griff allowed Hegel to at last be accepted 
in French philosophy, it also, ironically, marked the beginning of Hegel's downfall. 
In the Preface to Vers le concret,42 Wahl attacks Hegel's argument in the "Sense 
Certainty" chapter of the Phenomenology, according to which the most concrete and 
richest reality, that designated by the words "here," "now" and "mine," turns out to 
be the poorest and most abstract, since when these words are used by others, or by 
myself at another time, they refer to other things. Every " I" can say "I ," and so what 
I take to be most specific about myself is revealed to be the most empty kind of 
universality. But, cautions Wahl, we ought not to conclude with Hegel that language 
reveals the unreality of what was intended by " I" , "here," "now" etc. ; on the contrary, 
it is language that is revealed as impotent. Similarily, in the famous dialectic of being 
and nothingness, in which being turns out to be identical to nothingness,43 Hegel has 
confused words with things : real being with the concept "being," the concept "nothin-
gness" with the real nothingness described "phenomenologically" by Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger. The Hegelian dialectic, which concerns only words, is "inane." The genuine 
pursuit of the concrete, on the other hand, is "more an oscillation than a dialectic," 
and is "not immanent to the idea, or if it is, this is due to the idea striving for something 
other than itself," a concrete reality beyond thought which is "the limit of the dialectic 
and its origin." 
Wahl's critique of Hegel amounts to an affirmation of the unhappy consciousness. 
In order to preserve the concreteness of a reality that is not to be assimilated to thought, 
Wahl cannot allow thought and being to be united in a synthesis, at least not through 
reason. Reason can achieve a synthesis in thought, but it lacks the power to mediate 
between opposites or achieve a genuine synthesis in being. 
In this, Wahl takes his inspiration from Kierkegaard.44 Hegel's speculative media-
tions do no touch individual existence, which is marked by qualitative disjunctions 
(either/or) resolved only through passion — through resolute decision and the leap of 
faith, not through an immanent dialectical progression. Passion, however, can only 
"hold together" opposed extremes in the "moment of decision;" it cannot abolish 
oppositions, and the momentary resolution it achieves is valid only for the individual 
who makes it, not universally. But in that case there can be no universal science of 
existence, no Aufhehung of the individual in the universal, and no expression of 
subjective "inwardness" in the objective, universal medium of language. If Hegel 
thinks the unhappy consciousness is a surpassed "moment" of the dialectic, this is 
because he has confused himself with the Idea : he forgot that he existed. 
42. The preface was published separately as an article in Recherches philosophiques, 1 (1931-1932), p. 1-20. 
43. See HKGFL, Science of Logic, Vol. I, Book one, Section I, chapter I, "Being." 
44. See WAHL, "Hegel et Kierkegaard," RPFE, 111-112 (1931), p. 321-380; reprinted in Études kierkegaar-
diennes. 
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2. Koyré : the failure of language. 
The failure of the Hegelian dialectic, according to Wahl, can be attributed to the 
insurmountable distance between language and being. Since Hegel's language was 
meant to be "a dialectical synthesis of the diverse significations incarnated in words," 
and so rooted in a determinate historical existence of a linguistic community,41 this 
failure may seem puzzling, since language is on this account an expression of the 
historical being in which it is rooted, not some "invention." Yet Koyré points out the 
reason for this failure when he takes the section of the Phenomenology on "Culture"46 
as containing the key to Hegel's use of language. 
In this section, Hegel describes language as alienation : what one intends is never 
what language allows one to say, and yet language is the universal and objective 
expression of one's thought. Language reveals the objective truth of thought's inten-
tions : it is thought in otherness, as through it, thought objectifies itself, separates 
itself from itself and understands itself as others understand it. In that case, the "nearly 
ontological preponderance of language" in Hegel is "a trait of the dismembered 
consciousness [conscience déchirée] which is only in and by its reflection in the 
other."47 In other words, it appears that Hegel's use of language is a symptom of the 
unhappy consciousness, rather than a cure for it. 
3. Fondane, Breton: Surrealism. 
The critique of the "ontological preponderance" of language in Hegel went hand 
in hand with the Marxist and Surrealist criticism that Hegel had dissolved the real 
into the aether of pure thought.48 Yet the Surrealists, although they agreed with the 
Marxists that the unhappy consciousness raises the question of social injustice,49 could 
not accept Marxist solutions. 
For Benjamin Fondane, Marx was right to replace Hegel's Begrijfv/ïth "the whole 
of social relations,"50 but the latter, although seemingly concrete, is just another 
abstraction. Just as an individual pear is more real than the class "fruit," so an individual 
human being is more real than the totality of social relations.51 The problem of the 
unhappy consciousness — in this case, of a being that both is and is not its objective, 
social being — is not one that can be solved simply by a revolutionary transformation 
of social relations ; there always remains a difference between the individual and 
society, and a painfully felt contradiction between the inner and the outer self for 
which there is no social solution. In support of this view, Fondane refers to Freud's 
45. A. KOYRÉ, "Note sur la langue et la terminologie hégéliennes;' RPFE, 111-112 (1931), p. 409-439. 
46. See La Phénoménologie de l'esprit, trans. Hyppolite, vol. 2, section VLB., "L'esprit devenu étranger à 
soi-même, la culture." 
47. See KOYRÉ, "Note," p. 416-420. 
48. See Benjamin FONDANE, IXI Conscience malheureuse, Paris, Denoël et Steele, 1936, p. 53. 
49. FONDANE, op. cit., p. XI; see André BRETON, Manifestes du surréalisme (Idées), Paris, Gallimard, 1963, 
p. 93-98. 
50. FONDANE, p. 54. 
51. Ibid., p. 55-56. 
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Civilization and its Discontents, which argues that, since society is founded on the 
repression of instinct and the prohibition of the satisfaction of certain desires, the 
conflict between the individual and society is unsurpassable. 
Breton likewise refuses the Marxist limitation of the "suppleness" of "the negation 
of the negation" to only social and economic problems, and insists on raising the 
problems of "love, the dream, madness, art and religion."52 By placing the latter 
outside of the realm of the social, Breton, like Fondane, asserts a gap between subjective 
psychological existence and social reality. Nevertheless, for Breton, Hegel's argument 
that subjective life is permeated by the substantial life of the community anticipates 
Feuerbach's denial of consciousness as a separate faculty, Marx's critique of conscious 
representations of social reality as "ideology," and the theory of the unconscious in 
Eduard von Hartmann and in Freud.53 All of these are instances of the dependence 
of consciousness on something outside itself, on an "unconscious" of which conscious-
ness is the disguised representation. Because Hegel's basic schema can be expanded 
beyond the "economic base/ideological superstructure" model of Marxism, it is poten-
tially richer than Marxism, however "infantile" Hegel's dialectic becomes in Hegel's 
hands, where it is mere word-play.54 What Hegel points to, as Breton interprets him, 
is thus a series of divisions and oppositions that would extend the structures of the 
unhappy consciousness beyond the realm of consciousness proper. 
4. Lefebvre : the mystified consciousness.55 
Although Marxists such as Henri Lefebvre could not afford to ignore the theme 
of the unhappy consciousness, they could argue that the unhappy consciousness is not 
a truth of existence, but & false consciousness reflecting determinate historical condi-
tions : the felt separation between thought and being is due to the division between 
intellectual and manual labor.56 The contradictions within the individual and between 
the individual and society are more properly described as "alienation" :57 
The alienation of man is a living fact, attested to at each hour of the day by all of us. 
This solitude in the midst of the crowd is alienation. That ignorance of self, that lucidity 
without content, that abstraction without matter, this dispersion, this instinct without 
thought and thought without instinct, this despair : the alienation of the human {CM 148). 
Unlike more orthodox Marxists, however, Lefebvre does not hold that this alie-
nation is the passive reflection in consciousness of physical reality.58 On the contrary, 
52. See BRETON, op. cit., p. 95-97. 
53. Ibid., p. 94. 
54. See ibid., p. 96. 
55. See Henri LEFEBVRE and Norbert GUTERMAN, "Préface" to Morceaux choisis de Marx, Paris, Gallimard, 
1934 ; La Conscience mystifiée, Paris, Gallimard, 1936 ; "Introduction" to Lenin, Cahiers sur la dialectique 
de Hegel, Paris, Gallimard, 1938 ; Morceaux choisis de Hegel, Paris, Gallimard, 1939 ; and Henri LEFEBVRE, 
Le matérialisme dialectique, Paris, Alcan, 1939. 
56. See LEFEBVRE'S "Introduction" to LENIN'S Cahiers, p. 53-56, and La Conscience mystifiée (hereafter CM), 
p. 212-213. 
57. See CM, p. 148 and 176ff; LENIN'S Cahiers, p. 93-101. 
58. See CM, p. 176-178, 253-254, 258; Cahiers, p. 59 ; Morceaux choisis de Marx, p. 17. 
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consciousness is active, and it does more than it knows : we think through the body 
and through praxis,59 and because of this, there is an unconscious within consciousness, 
"a content of consciousness that determines consciousness but which consciousness 
does not grasp or know" {CM 256).60 Alienation can be overcome, then, not by reflection 
or thought alone, but by a praxis that would give us mastery over our natural and 
social selves.61 Man's return to himself from out of his alienated state is accomplished 
in the "unity of the individual and the social, man's possession of nature and of his 
own nature [which] defines 'Total Man'."62 The revolutionary is thus an "unhappy 
consciousness" who seeks to overcome his unhappiness {CM 212-213) by overturning 
a regime where men are alienated because they are dominated by the fetishized products 
of their own labour, i.e. by commodities.63 In short, what is needed is not philosophical 
reconciliation through the "notion," but "changing the world and [...] really abolishing 
existing contradictions in order to arrive at the truly human."64 
Lefebvre, who came to Marxism through surrealism, here accomplishes a kind 
of synthetic tour deforce of themes from existentialism, surrealism and Marxism, all 
centering on the figure of the unhappy consciousness, a consciousness torn by contra-
dictions within itself and with reality. Like the Surrealists, Lefebvre sees consciousness 
as dominated by an unconscious which it cannot know or control. Nevertheless, 
Lefebvre's belief in a "total man" that would be a synthesis of all oppositions, including 
that between consciousness {le pour soi) and the nonconscious {l'en soi),b5 places 
Lefebvre solidly on the side of the philosophers of totality and synthesis. Indeed, his 
postulation of a total reconciliation in a revolutionary future is a subordination of 
oneself to a beyond which is characteristic of the unhappy consciousness in its religious 
form;66 for according to Hegel, religion is the projection of the complete and "happy" 
self outside of oneself, in the form of an Other who is an Absolute Subject (God).67 
Lefebvre's humanistic "dialectical materialism" may have brought this Hegelian Spirit 
down to earth, but it is still in essence a theology, the belief in a supreme synthesis 
which could mediate all oppositions. 
5. Sartre's understanding of Hegel in Being and Nothingness. 
Sartre's theory of the unhappy consciousness owes much to Wahl, but it is based 
primarily on a theory of the temporality of human reality that derives from Heidegger, 
via Koyré. 
59. See Cahiers, p. 59. 
60. Cf. LEFEBVRE, Le matérialisme dialectique, p. 98, 122-123. 
61. See Cahiers, p. 62, Morceaux choisis de Marx, p. 24-25, Le matérialisme dialectique, p. 102. and Morceaux 
choisis de Hegel, p. 17. 
62. Cahiers, p. 98; cf. Le matérialisme dialectique, p. 149. 
63. See CM, p. 180-191 ; Morceaux choisis de Marx, p. 18; Le matérialisme dialectique, p. 140-142. 
64. Morceaux choisis de Marx, p. 29; cf. Le matérialisme dialectique, p. 58-60, 144-145. 
65. See Morceaux choisis de Hegel, p. 17-18. 
66. See FONDANE, p. 51-52. 
67. See WAHL, "Commentaire." and KOJÈVE, "Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme," Critique, 3-4 (1946), p. 339-
366 and "Christianisme et Communisme," Critique, 3-4, (1946), p. 308-312. 
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For Sartre, all consciousness is, as Husserl said, consciousness of something. 
However, consciousness only becomes aware of that thing by transcending the thing 
as it presents itself to consciousness towards the horizon of other possible appearances 
of the object, which are correlative to future consciousnesses. The present of conscious-
ness is thus defined on the basis of an irreal totality of consciousness which is not 
yet and which would allow consciousness to define its object, and thereby define itself 
as "consciousness of that object.68 Consciousness, then, seeks to define itself through 
a closed and determinate totality which would define its object, and yet which would 
be a totality of consciousnesses, that is, of the open-ended acts of transcendence. Such 
a totality is an impossible synthesis of infinite transcendence and determinate finitude. 
Yet consciousness is implicated in this totality to the extent that it is consciousness 
of lis object, that is, to the extent it is consciousness at all. In that sense, consciousness 
both is and is not the impossible totality through which it defines itself and the absence 
of which it suffers as a "lack" of its own being. If consciousness succeeded in satisfying 
this "lack," this would be because the totality had truly become closed, and conscious-
ness could be confined to that closed totality only if it ceased to be intentionality and 
transcendence. In other words, such satisfaction would be the death of consciousness. 
For that reason, human reality : 
[.. .J is perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely 
because it cannot attain the in-itself [closure, identity] without losing itself as for-itself. 
It is thus by nature an unhappy consciousness, with no possible transcendence of its 
unhappy state (EN 129). 
Being and Nothingness is the narrative of the unhappy consciousness's vain attempts 
to fulfill itself by becoming the impossible totality, the synthesis that is the in-itself-
for-itself, or God (EN 678, 685). To the extent that human reality tries to be itself, it 
finds it is not itself ; to the extent it tries to flee its being by affirming itself as pure 
transendence, it discovers its facticity : the givenness of its past, its body, its relations 
with others and its historical situation. 
These reversals, which Wahl had defined as characteristic of the unhappy 
consciousness, are also characteristic of "bad faith," which is an oscillation from 
transcendence to facticity and vice versa. The best example of this is not that of the 
waiter, but that of the coquette, who can affirm her dinner partner's hand is "just a 
hand" in order to see that it is not also a gesture (of seduction), and at the same time 
affirms that she is not merely a body in order to deny that it is to her (living, sexual) 
body that her companion's gestures are addressed (EN 91-92). This involves an exploi-
tation of the ambiguous character of human reality (EN 133n) : consciousness cannot 
be its transcendence in the way a table is a table, and it cannot not be its facticity 
(although it transcends it) in the way in which a table is not an ink-well. Instead of 
realizing a synthesis, consciousness in bad faith is caught up in an incessant play of 
self-negations (EN 124) unmediated by any "third term," such as the Freudian 
"censor." 
68. See SARTRE, "La temporalité chez Faulkner," Situations I (Idées), Paris, Gallimard, 1975, p. 96. 
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Yet it is not just in bad faith that consciousness is unhappy ; to Wahl's question, 
"can there be any but an unhappy consciousness,"69 Sartre's answer would appear to 
be "no." At every level, according to Sartre, consciousness seeks unity and finds 
division. At the level of the pre-reflective cogito, consciousness is separated from its 
present (as "consciousness o/x") by its future. At the reflective level, the consciousness 
that reflects on itself does not coincide with the consciousness upon which it reflects. 
Finally, at the intersubjective level, when consciousness seeks validation in the 
consciousness of another, it finds that it both is and is not the being which is an object 
for the Other. Although 1 may not see myself the way the Other sees me, experiences 
such as shame reveal to me that I acknowledge being the object to which the Other's 
judgment refers. Consciousness can neither be its being-for-others, then, nor escape 
that being. 
This last point marks a major disagreement between Sartre and Kojève. Sartre 
argues that reciprocal recognition is impossible (for the one recognizing inevitably 
makes the one recognized into an object),10 and so then is any absolute community 
or "kingdom of ends," in which each is an end for the other and finds himself in the 
other who recognizes him.71 For Sartre, each for-itself defines itself as not-being the 
others; consequently "no totalitarian and unifying synthesis of 'others' is possible" 
(EN 298). For Kojève, on the contrary, the "fight to the death" is an early stage of 
inter-subjective relations ; it is transcended in the work of the slave, whose mastery 
of nature presages humanity's technological mastery of nature (ILH 34), and in the 
slave's replacement of the fear of the Master with the fear of death, which makes 
possible the self-mastery of freedom-for-death and reveals the Master to be equal to 
the slave in his mortality. This process culminates in the modern world of technology 
and of the "universal homogeneous state," which recognizes all subjects equally "or 
in a classless society comprising the whole of humanity,"72 a transnational and tran-
sethnic classless society.73 Wars and revolutions would then no longer be possible < ILH 
145, 561), real work would end (ILH 114, 383, 435), and workers will work as little 
as possible, for "There is nothing more to do." But since the essence of man is 
historical overcoming, struggle and labour (ILH 378n, 435, 490-492, 560), the end 
of work (and the end of history) is the death of man. 
Sartre rules out this final synthesis because of the irreducible plurality of conscious-
nesses : 1 cannot simply be the object I am for the other without ceasing to be 
consciousness, and I cannot assimilate the other into my world, since the other-as-
subject is not an object, but is revealed in my experiencing of myself as an object. 
There is no "common ground" that would enable self and other to exist on the same 
level and in the same manner; rather, there is an "infernal circle" of consciousnesses 
69. WAHL, "Note sur les démarches...," p. 283. 
70. See EN, p. 288. 
71. See WAHL, "Commentaire," p. 444, 446. 
72. KOJÈVE, "Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme," p. 354-356. See also KOJEVE'S "Tyranny and Wisdom," a 
translation of La Tyrannie et la Sagesse, Paris, Gallimard, 1954, by Michael Gold, in Leo STRAUSS, On 
Tyranny, edited by Allan Bloom, Ithaca, Agora Paperbacks, 1968, p. 143-188, especially pages 154-156 
of the translation. 
73. See "Tyranny and Wisdom," p. 156 and 183. 
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transcending others and being transcended in turn by them. The only possible mediation 
between these anti-thetical standpoints would have to come from a standpoint that 
comprised both, that of the Totality, but no individual can take the point of view of 
the totality on himself and others (EN 288-289). But if there is no Totality through 
which all viewpoints could be mediated and reconciled, there can be no universal and 
homogeneous community in which each recognizes and is recognized by the other. 
For Sartre, the divisions from which the unhappy consciousness suffers cannot be 
mended or surpassed. In Being and Nothingness, at any rate, Sartre reveals himself 
as an anti-dialectical thinker. 
III. THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS IN FRANCE TODAY 
In this final section, I would like to suggest ways in which Derrida and others 
like him are still haunted by the unhappy consciousness. My remarks here are meant 
to be suggestive and provisional ; a fuller analysis would require another paper. 
Derrida attempts to "detotalize" the unifying totality of the sign. For Derrida, 
the sign joins together a signifier and a signified without there being any synthesis 
of the two, the relation between the two terms being completely arbitrary. Signifier 
and signified are not related to each other as thesis and anti-thesis, that is, as "moments" 
of a unitary sign that conserves and surpasses them. On the contrary, they retain a 
virulent and unmediated difference: because of the arbitrariness of the signifier/signi-
fied relation, there is no rational link between them that would enable one to pass 
from the one to the other through some sort of dialectical necessity. Yet if we cannot 
transcend the signifier towards the signified, this threatens the very possibility of 
signifying, and thereby threatens the "subject" as one who signifies. The dissolution 
of the sign, then, implies the dissolution of the subject. 
This dissolution could not be remedied without also threatening the subject, 
however, since it is the difference between the signifier and signified that allows the 
former to stand for the latter, and so creates meaning. Much as, for Sartre, consciousness 
can realize itself as an in-itself totality only by ceasing to be consciousness, a complete 
identity of signifier and signified would be the death of meaning.74 On the other hand, 
much as Sartrean consciousness both is and is not the totality towards which it 
transcends, the meaning-giving difference between signifier and signified presupposes 
the two being joined together in the sign which they thus are and are not. The Derridean 
sign, then, like the unhappy consciousness, confronts difference when it strives to 
unite itself into an identity, and yet discovers its unity when it tries to affirm itself as 
pure difference : pure difference is a dream.75 
In this transposition of the structure of the unhappy consciousness into the sign, 
Derrida in effect follows Wahl's making the unhappy consciousness the basis for the 
Hegelian Be griff. Even more so, Derrida's strategy parallels Koyré's making the tem-
74. See Jacques DERRIDA, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. David 
B. Allison and Newton Garver, Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 52-54. 
75. DKRRIDA, L'écriture et la différence, Paris, Seuil, 1967, p. 224; Writing and Difference, p. 151. 
437 
BRUCE BAUGH 
porality of Dasein the structure of the Be griff; Derridean "différance" also points to 
"the irreducibility of temporalizing" as what makes possible a "sameness which is 
not identical" — or a "self which is not identical,"76 which we might call "a being 
which is what it is not and which is not what it is." Indeed, Derrida remarks that "the 
property of the representamen is to be itself and another [...] to be separated from 
itself," and so to differ from itself prior to ever simply being itself.77 Like Sartrean 
consciousness and like Koyré's "man", the sign's primary temporal dimension is the 
future : meaning must await its inscription in a signifier in order for it to differ from 
itself as the signified of that signifier, and so be meaning, which means that it is 
separated from its past, its possibility of being signfied, by its own future, and so can 
never coincide with itself.78 Meaning exists only as the possibility of meaning : the 
completion of the sign in a univocal signifier/signified relation, which would allow 
for the presence of signified behind a completely effaced or transparent signifier, would 
close the temporal gap and annihilate the meaning-giving différance. 
The structure of unreconciled sameness and difference, multiplicity and unity which 
is characteristic of the unhappy consciousness, and which leads to anti-thetical reversals, 
all this is repeated in the Derridean sign. Mikel Dufrenne said of Hegel that "in introducing 
negation into the heart of being, tragedy into the heart of the Absolute, Hegel is more 
existentialist than existentialism. For existentialism, only consciousness is negative [...] 
For Hegel, the unhappiness of consciousness is the unhappiness of being."79 For Derrida, 
it is the unhappiness of meaning. For Hegel, naturally, being is all, but since for Derrida 
there is nothing outside the text, the unhappiness of meaning is universal. Both Hegel 
(as Dufrenne reads him) and Derrida are pan-tragicist. 
Earlier I cited Sartre's remark that human reality is an unhappy consciousness 
with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state. I do not mean to endorse or deny 
this view ; rather, I have merely tried to suggest the extent to which it is true for 
modern French philsophy, which can be seen, in part, as the history of various 
manifestations of the unhappy consciousness. I would also like to suggest that as part 
of that history, Sartre (despite his ideological pronouncements on behalf of "totality") 
is part of the resistance to the will to totality and synthesis, a resistance whose hero 
is not Kojève, but which includes Wahl, Breton, and Derrida. It is in these figures, 
and not in any self-declared Hegelians, that Hegel's thought has had its most profound 
and important impact on French philosophy.80 
76. See Speech and Phenomena, p. 129, 139. 
77. See DERRIDA, Of Grammatology, p. 49-50. 
78. See "Force and Signification," Writing and Difference, p. 11, and Of Grammatology, p. 61 : " [... | the 
origin never even disappeared, it was never constituted except reciprocally by a non-origin, the trace, which 
thus becomes the origin of the origin." In other words, the future inscription of a signifier founds the past 
it signifies. 
79. DUFRENNE, "La thèse de Jean Hyppolite," Fontaine, 11 (1947), p. 470. 
80. If Gwendoline Jarczyck and Pierre-Jean Labarrière are representative, then it is the Christian tradition of Henri 
Niel that is ascendent in French Hegel studies today. See NIEL, De la médiation dans la philosophie de .Hegel, 
Paris, Aubier, 1945; JARCZYCK and LABARRIÈRE, Hegeliana, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1986. 
The theistic nature of the latter is brought out when Jarczyck and Labarrière argue that for Hegel, "the common 
becoming of man and world" is governed by an eternal law that spirit historically gives itself and develops 
(p. 317-319), a law set forth in the U)gic, and which governs both nature and history. 
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